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ABSTRACT 
 
This study further develops our understanding of the employment 
experiences of children (ages 9-11) and adolescents (ages 12-14) in the Canadian 
province of Alberta, with particular attention to illegal employment and the 
effectiveness of complaint-based regulation. Survey data demonstrates there is a 
significant degree of illegal employment among children and adolescents. 
Interview data suggests that complaint-driven regulation of child labour is 
ineffective because parents, children and adolescents cannot identify violations 
and do not take action to trigger state enforcement. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
anadian governments regulate the employment of minors, 
particularly those under age 15. Initial research in the Canadian 
province of Alberta identified potentially illegal employment among 
children (9-11) and adolescents (12-14). When combined with an analysis of 
enforcement activity, this data suggested complaint-driven enforcement may be 
ineffective at ensuring compliance with child labour laws (Barnetson, 2009a). 
This study uses survey and interview data to examine this possibility. 
The survey data indicates 6.3% of children (age 9-11) and 19.4% of 
adolescents (age 12-14) were employed in 2008/09. Seventy-eight percent of 
employed children worked in prohibited occupations while the legality of the 
work performed by the remainder was unclear. Over 21% of employed 
adolescents worked in prohibited occupations, while the legality of work 
performed by a further 50% of the sample was unclear. 
Twenty parent-child interviews with employed minors found most minors 
and their parents were unable to identify basic substantive employment rights 
C 
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and the violations of their rights that they experienced. Further, the majority of 
those interviewed did not identify filing a complaint with government as a 
possible remedy. These findings suggest that the requirements for effective 
complaint-driven compliance (knowledge of a violation generating a complaint) 
are typically absent and thus complaint-drive regulation is not an effective way 
to enforce child labour laws. 
 
REGULATION OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT LABOUR IN CANADA 
 
CONTEMPORARY PRACTICES 
 
All Canadian provinces regulate the employment of children and adolescents 
via an amalgam of employment/labour standards, school attendance, child 
welfare, and occupational health and safety legislation (HRSDC, 2006; England, 
2008). The regulatory framework varies between provinces and contains 
exceptions, such as child and adolescent agricultural employment in Alberta 
(Barnetson, 2009b). Breslin, Koehoorn and Cole (2008) report adolescent 
employment in British Columbia at 41.5% in 2005 and in Ontario at 52.9% in 
2003. In Alberta, Barnetson (2009a) reported a child employment rate of 8.7% and 
an adolescent employment rate of 29.4% in 2008. Differences in data collection 
and the definition of employment are probable explanations for the discrepancy 
in adolescent employment levels. 
Like most North American jurisdictions, Alberta relies heavily on complaints 
to trigger enforcement of labour laws. Complaint-driven enforcement in Canada 
has been the subject of some criticism. It tends to address mainly violations 
affecting former employees (Adams, 1987) and reveals only a minority of actual 
violations. There is substantial evidence of widespread violations of employment 
standards in Canada. Ontario’s Provincial Auditor (2004) noted that between 
40% and 90% of proactive inspections (varying by sector) found violations of 
minimum standards. Similar rates of non-compliance were found federally, with 
25% of federal employers not in compliance with most obligations under Part III 
of the federal act and 75% not in compliance with at least one provision (Arthurs, 
2006). 
On the other hand, complaint-driven enforcement does focus regulatory 
effort on workplaces exhibiting significant non-compliance. The effectiveness of 
this approach at remedying noncompliance turns on the degree to which 
workers will complain. Examining complaints under the US Fair Labor Standards 
Act and the Occupational Health and Safety Act, Weil and Pyles (2005) found 
relatively little relationship between complaint and non-compliance levels. That 
is to say, complaints were not a good predictor of actual levels of violations 
within industries, with complaint levels often far below violation levels. For 
example, on average, Weil and Pyles found 130 overtime pay violations for every 
11   Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society—Volume 16—Spring 2010   
 
 
complaint filed, with some industries seeing over 800 violations per complaint. 
And there were, on average, 120 injuries for every health and safety complaint 
pursued by a regulator. 
Weil and Pyles (2005) suggest that worker propensity for triggering 
enforcement can be explained by workers’ assessment of the perceived costs and 
benefits of triggering enforcement. When a tipping point is reached, complaints 
commence. The cost-benefit calculus of workers can be affected by several 
factors. The degree of benefit workers expect from a complaint turns on worker 
knowledge of what their rights are as well as their perception of what the 
regulator can and will do to improve their working conditions. Workers may 
also under-estimate the benefits of a complaint because costs of non-compliance 
may be inaccurately perceived, particularly with regard to health and safety. The 
perceived costs associated with complaints can include the cost of acquiring 
knowledge about rights and remedies, current workplace conditions, and how to 
enforce one’s rights. Workers must also consider potential employer retaliation 
such as shift rescheduling, being denied overtime and being fired. The perceived 
costs (high) and benefits (low) of complaints may result in relatively limited 
complaint activity. 
These concerns aside, complaint-driven enforcement is often thought an 
appropriate enforcement technique because adults are a (notionally) free party to 
the employment contract. This is consistent with the liberal-voluntarism 
perspective that has historically underlain Canadian employment standards 
(Thomas, 2009). It is unclear if this reasoning is equally applicable to minors. 
While adults and minors hold broadly similar labour market positions, there are 
significant differences in their social location (Bernstein, Lippel, Tucker and 
Vosko, 2006). Minors are less likely than adults to know their rights and be able 
to determine if their treatment is lawful. To file a complaint, minors must face the 
power the employer wields due to the master-and-servant dynamic as well as the 
power differential associated with adult-child relationships. This situation raises 
the possibility that complaint-based enforcement of child labour laws is 
ineffective. If this approach yields few complaints, violations of child labour law 
becomes administratively invisible and the slim prospect of enforcement is 
unlikely to discourage violations.  
While state-regulation of child employment is the norm, there are examples 
of governments devolving responsibility to parents. For example, 2003 changes 
in British Columbia transferred responsibility for assessing the appropriateness 
of adolescent employment to parents (Irwin, McBride and Stubin, 2005; Luke and 
Moore, 2004). Similarly, in 2005, Alberta altered the regulation of adolescent 
employment in restaurants and food services such that parents are effectively 
responsible for determining whether such work is permissible and safe 
(Barnetson, 2009a; Schultz and Taylor, 2006).  
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Where state-regulation is primarily complaint driven, parents play a pivotal 
role in triggering enforcement activity. It is unclear if parents have the 
knowledge necessary to make informed decisions about the appropriateness or 
safety of employment. It is also unclear how many parents meaningfully 
consider those questions. These approaches also assume parents can and do act 
in their children’s best interests, thereby ignoring the possibility that economic 
pressure may negatively influence parental decision-making (Teeple, 2006). 
These factors are among the reasons that states began regulating child labour 
over a century ago (Tucker, 1990; Thomas, 2009). 
 
POLICY RATIONALE 
 
To understand why governments are shifting responsibility for regulating 
child labour to parents, it is useful to consider the contradictory demands 
governments face. On the one hand, Canadian governments must facilitate the 
capital accumulation process. That is to say, they must act in ways that allow 
employers to produce goods and services in a profitable manner and thereby 
encourage private investment. Failing to do so may result in an economic 
downturn, for which the government may well be held responsible.  On the other 
hand, governments must maintain their own legitimacy with the electorate as 
well as the legitimacy of the capitalist social formation. The operation of 
capitalist systems often negatively affects workers (who comprise the majority of 
the electorate) and thereby imperil both a particular government and the 
capitalist social formation (Tucker, 1983/84, 1988, 1990; Thomas, 2009).  
An attractive policy for governments regarding child labour is to set 
standards but enforce them only when a consequence of such employment 
creates the spectre of a legitimation crisis. In this situation, regulation can be 
complaint-based with prosecution being required only when a child has been 
seriously injured or killed. For example, Alberta almost never prosecutes those 
who violate child or adolescent labour laws. In 2009, after years of employment 
standards violations at Edmonton’s Capital Exhibition and the Calgary 
Stampede, the province did charge one employer with having a 15-year-old 
(technically a “young person” under the Act) working after midnight. These 
charges were laid one year after the event occurred (O’Donnell, 2009, 
Government of Alberta, 2010).  
More commonly, the province issues cease-and-desist orders and requires 
financial restitution. In this way, the risk associated with violation is simply 
paying what should have been paid in the first place. For example, planned 
charges against a large restaurant chain (with a record of repeatedly violating the 
law) in 2007 were not filed after the owner agreed to pay the wages owed. The 
potential cost savings (in the case of the employer discussed above who intruded 
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on the interview, two-thirds of wage costs) creates an incentive for employers to 
violate the law.  
The only example of successful employment standards prosecution since 
2000 is Domo Gasoline. In 2002, it pled guilty to some of the charges laid against 
it in 2001 related to illegal employee deductions (the remaining charges being 
dropped) and received a $5750 fine (the maximum corporate fine was $100,000) 
(AHRE, 2002). Interestingly, it was charged again in 2003 for the similar offenses 
and pled guilty to some of the charges (the remainder being dropped). The fine 
was $23,000 (AHRE, 2003, 2004). This suggests probable fine levels are not 
necessarily a significant deterrent, particularly since the province is prepared to 
negotiate partially dropping charges as well as the fine level.  
This approach is not unique to child labour. In 2008, 56% of businesses 
employing temporary foreign workers that were inspected were found to be 
violating employment standards regulations. In 2009, that percentage jumped to 
almost 75%. Alberta’s Minster of Employment and Immigration suggests 
widespread non-compliance is “’a really good news story,’ since it means people 
are reporting workplace problems to the government” (McLean, 2010: 1). In both 
these cases, non-enforcement of the law opens up a low-cost, secondary labour 
market to capital. As noted by a reviewer, this may be a part of a broad and 
intentional erosion of working class living standards. Not regulating child labour 
also frees children and adolescents to undertake childcare and other domestic 
duties. This, in turn, releases women from some tasks associated with social 
reproduction to undertake waged work—again, expanding the labour pool and 
potentially depressing wages.  
 
METHOD 
 
The study seeks to expand our understanding of the employment 
experiences of minors in Alberta through both survey data and interviews and 
thereby get at the effectiveness of complaint-based regulation. Questions were 
added to the annual Alberta Survey of 1200 homes conducted by the University 
of Alberta’s Population Research Laboratory. This telephone survey has an 
estimated sampling error of 2.8% at the 95% confidence level and asked adults 
about the employment of children and adolescents who lived in their home to 
determine: 
 
1. What were the rates of child (ages 9-11) and adolescent (ages 12-14) 
employment in Alberta, between May 2008 and May 2009? 
2. In what occupation(s) did this employment occur? 
3. How many hours per week (on average) were children and adolescents 
employed during the school year? 
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The first question sought to replicate results from a 2008 survey (Barnetson, 
2009a). The second and third questions sought to gain additional information 
bearing upon the legality of the employment.  
At the same time, 20 non-representative interviews were completed. The 
thirty-minute, semi-structured joint interviews with a minor (aged 10-15) and 
one parent/guardian focused on the minor’s employment experience(s) in the 
past year. Subjects were solicited via advertisements and, subsequently, via the 
snowball technique. The interviews addressed five topics: 
 
1. Do minors and their parents know the rules that typically are of concern 
in child and adolescent employment? 
2. What violations of employment standards did minors experience? 
3. Did the minor or the minor’s parent(s) identify the violation(s)? 
4. If so, (how) did the minor or the minor’s parent(s) seek and achieve 
remedy?  
5. Did the parent consider whether employment was safe before work 
commenced? And how was the assessment made? 
 
The non-random sample and open-ended interview approach suggests that 
chance and interviewer bias may be significant sources of error. As a 
constructivist, I accept that bias is an endemic feature of policy analysis, 
reflecting that data selection and interpretation occurs in the context of 
researcher experiences, beliefs and expectations (Hawkesworth, 1988). The 
interview results are not statistically generalizable but they are analytically 
generalizable: this study’s results may be used in conjunction with the results 
from other studies to develop, confirm or refute a broader theory about the 
effectiveness of this regulatory approach.  
 
SURVEY RESULTS 
 
EMPLOYMENT RATES  
 
Respondents in 118 households reported a total of 143 children (aged 9-11). 
Of these, nine children (6.3%) were reported as having worked in the past year. 
This percentage is lower than 2008 data (8.7%). Assuming the 2009 data is 
representative, this suggests approximately 8,200 children were employed 
throughout the province. The difference between 2008 and 2009 results is within 
the margin of error. Overall, it appears reasonable to assume that between 5 and 
10% of children ages 9-11 perform waged work in Alberta outside of the home. 
Respondents in 130 households report a total of 144 adolescents (aged 12-14). 
Of these, 28 adolescents (19.4%) were reported as having worked in the past 
year. This percentage is notably below 2008 levels (29.4%). Assuming the 2009 
15   Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society—Volume 16—Spring 2010   
 
 
data is representative, this suggests approximately 26,000 adolescents employed 
throughout the province. The discrepancy in adolescent employment between 
2008 and 2009 may be partially explained by the significant change in Alberta’s 
economy between the surveys. In June 2008, overall unemployment was 3.3%. A 
year later, unemployment was 6.8%. Youth (aged 15-24) traditionally have higher 
unemployment rates and experienced a near doubling of unemployment during 
this period (Government of Alberta, 2009).  
In a time of contraction, it seems possible that part-time employment for 
adolescents (who comprise a transient and secondary labour market) would 
shrink faster than for other groups. The apparent stability in child employment 
may reflect that the type of employment undertaken by children (e.g., 
babysitting, yard work, flyer delivery) is less susceptible to economic changes, 
reflecting a looser relationship between demand for the jobs they perform and 
overall economic activity. It may also reflect more personal employment 
relationships between children and their employers. 
 
JOB TYPE AND HOURS OF WORK 
 
Data about hours of work and job type was collected regarding 35 of the 37 
employed children and adolescents. This group worked an average of 5.2 hours 
per week over the past year (range: 0-20 hours weekly). Respondents also listed 
the jobs performed. Babysitting (31.2%) and newspaper/flyer delivery (15.6%) 
were the most common answers. Restaurant work and janitorial work were each 
performed by 7.8% of the sample, followed by working on a golf course, working 
in sports, agricultural work, and performing yard work (5.2% each). Chores, 
construction work, office work and unspecified work were each performed by 
2.6% of respondents.  
Of the jobs performed by children (9-11), 78% were illegal forms of 
employment (newspaper delivery, janitorial services) while the legality of the 
remaining 22% (babysitting, chores) is unclear. Babysitting and chores fall into a 
legislative lacuna.  While children are statutorily precluded from working in 
Alberta, babysitting and yard work by children and adolescents is excluded by 
bureaucratic policy from the ambit of the Act. The precise reason for this 
exclusion is elusive but the answer typically given is these forms of work are not 
employment because there is no intention to establish an ongoing employment 
relationship.  
This blanket exclusion does not appear to consider the specifics of 
arrangements. For example, I might hire an adolescent to attend my house 
weekly for two hours on a Monday to care for my child while my wife and I go 
to dinner (we call this “date night”). In this arrangement, I direct the 
performance of the adolescent, provide the tools and equipment, and the 
adolescent (earning a fixed hourly wage) has no chance of profit or loss. Further, 
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the adolescent holds no other employment, cannot subcontract the work and the 
work cannot be easily severed from the operation of my household (i.e., someone 
has to look after the kids!).  
This fairly common arrangement suggests the blanket exclusion is 
inappropriate. Further, by placing these children in the same labour-market 
position as, for example, subcontractors in the construction industry, this policy 
exclusion appears to run contrary to the intent of the legislation. The purpose of 
the Employment Standards Code is to ensure minimum employment standards are 
met and risks inherent to employment for children and adolescents are 
minimized through regulation and prohibition. Excluding the most common 
forms of child employment by policy does not advance these goals.  
Of the jobs performed by adolescents, 21.4% are illegal forms of employment 
(janitorial services, sports teams, working on a golf course). Nevertheless, the 
ability of employers to gain exceptions via special permits may reduce this 
percentage marginally. By contrast, 28.6% of jobs appear to be legal types of 
employment (newspaper delivery, retail sales, restaurants, agriculture). The data 
does not offer enough detail to determine if job duties comply with permitting 
limitations (e.g., not working around deep fryers in restaurants), if daily or 
weekly work duration limits have been exceeded or other legal requirements 
have been met. The remaining 50% of jobs performed are of unclear legality 
(babysitting, yard work, and unspecified duties). 
 
INTERVIEW RESULTS 
 
VIOLATIONS IDENTIFIED 
 
Twenty 30-minute interviews included 10 children, 10 adolescents and 17 
parents (three pairs of siblings were interviewed). The children performed jobs 
outside of their homes that included babysitting, yard work, flyer delivery, dog 
walking and clerking. The adolescents performed retail, restaurant, flyer 
delivery, babysitting, clerking, yard maintenance and coaching jobs. In 19 of the 
20 interviews, subjects reported violations of employment standards rules. The 
violations included: 
 
 Working too many hours, most commonly a four-hour shift on a school 
day. 
 Receiving less than the minimum wage or minimum call-in pay. 
 Working under age or in prohibited occupations or performing 
prohibited tasks. 
 
The majority of adolescents in the restaurant industry also report illegal 
levels of deduction for uniforms and failure of employers to obtain parental 
17   Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society—Volume 16—Spring 2010   
 
 
permission and provide safety checklists. Half of the subjects reported multiple 
violations. The subjects were unaware that the behaviours they described were 
violations excepting in a single case where the employer revealed the violation 
after Alberta Employment Standards ordered a change in working hours.  
 
KNOWLEDGE OF RIGHTS  
 
Children, adolescents and their parents were asked five questions to assess 
their knowledge of basic employment rights. The first three questions addressed 
basic substantive rights commonly violated: 
 
1. the minimum age for employment in Alberta (12), 
2. the maximum shift length someone aged 12 to 14 can work (2 hours on a 
school day, 8 hours on a non-school day), and 
3. the minimum call-in pay is required for attending at the workplace (2 
hours at minimum wage on a school day, 3 hours otherwise). 
 
Answers were scored generously, with partially correct answers being 
considered “correct”. Overall, six of twenty minors and six of seventeen parents 
correctly identified the minimum age of employment, although two of the 
parents volunteered they knew the answer only because their child’s employer 
had told them. Only three minors and two parents were able to identify 
maximum shift length, again with one parent volunteering she knew the answer 
only because her child’s employer had told her. Finally, two minors and nine 
parents were able to identify required call-in pay, with the majority of parents 
indicating they knew the answer from personal experience receiving it. 
The fourth and fifth questions were more complex, addressing the recurring 
issue of (il)legal deductions an employer might make for uniforms/equipment or 
cash shortages:  
 
1. whether employers can deduct money to pay for a uniform (yes, if the 
employee agrees and the deduction does not reduce hourly wages below 
the minimum wage), and 
2. whether employers can deduct money from a paycheque to cover a cash 
shortfall (only if the employee had sole access to the till). 
 
Again, scoring was generous. Any answer that touched upon the contingent 
nature of employers’ right to make these deductions was considered correct. The 
only correct answer was from a parent indicating permission was required for a 
uniform deduction.  
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KNOWLEDGE OF WORKPLACE 
 
Parental knowledge of the workplace was assessed by asking parents and 
their child a series of questions regarding the minor’s condition of employment. 
Parents generally understood the when and where of their child’s work as well 
as the remuneration provided. That said, parents’ ignorance of statutory 
requirements meant they generally could not identify when their children’s 
rights were being violated by their working conditions. There also appeared to 
be a disconnection between the requirements parents indentified and their 
children’s situation. For example, it was not uncommon for parents to indicate a 
minimum age for employment higher than their child’s present age.  
An interesting discrepancy arose when parents were asked if they had 
considered whether the job was safe before the minor started employment, how 
they formed their conclusions about the safety, and whether there had been 
safety training provided. Approximately half of parents indicated they had 
considered whether the work was safe before the child started. Of these, all 
formed their opinion on the basis of their own experiences in similar jobs, their 
perceptions of the workplace as a customer, and/or the general reputation of the 
company. For example: 
 
Q:  When your daughter was hired, did you explicitly consider how safe the job was before 
she started and, if so, how did you form you opinion? 
A:  Yes. Feel for the store plus I have heard from friends and people I know that 
<employer> has a good reputation as an employer, especially with students who 
were going to school so I was confident she was going into a good environment 
and that they have rules and regulations set up that they wouldn’t abuse there.  
Q:  Did you go in the store…” 
A:  Not that particular store but we shop there…  
 
In this particular case, the employer routinely violated the hours of work 
requirement and, while it provided online safety modules, it did not ensure the 
adolescent completed them (she did not).  
No parents indicated they had acquired any specific evidence about 
workplace risks or used that evidence in their decision-making. In some 
instances, parents were surprised to learn that their child routinely handled box 
cutters, worked on ladders, lifted heavy boxes and used fryers and other 
equipment. Among the injuries reported were burns, cuts and back injuries. This 
suggests that basing public policy on the assumption that parents meaningfully 
consider safety and do so in an effective manner may be inappropriate.  
Safety orientations occurred in a minority of workplaces. In several instances, 
parents asserted that safety training had been performed. When children were 
asked about this, significant discrepancies emerged.  
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Q:  When your son was hired, did he get any instruction about how to complete the job 
safety? 
A:  Yes, I think they just went over all of his duties. I’m not sure what they told him 
about safety. But I have an idea in my head that they probably said, eye station is 
here, don’t lift stuff over this amount. 
 
Q:  When you were hired, did you get any instruction about how to complete the job safety? 
A:  Yeah, they taught me all of the stuff, but they didn’t really teach me where stuff 
was. It was just left in the staff room. And there were notes and stuff all over the 
wall. Notes about safety and lifting and ladders. It was left to you to discover. 
 
In half of the cases, neither the employer nor the parent provided safety 
training to the minor. Where safety information was available in the workplace, 
minors were often given access to information (e.g., posters on the wall, 
pamphlets, online training modules) but were not specifically directed to read it 
and their knowledge was not assessed. Where such passive safety information 
was provided, the minors universally did not engage with the material. The only 
two employers that provided proper safety orientations were not-for-profit 
agencies. No employer belonging to a large chain provided orientations that met 
requirements under either the Employment Standards Code (for restaurants) or the 
Occupational Health and Safety Code. 
 
INFORMATIONAL AND REMEDIAL STRATEGIES 
 
Children, adolescents and their parents were asked where they would find 
information if they had a question about the rules governing employment and 
how they would resolve a dispute if they thought their employer was not living 
up to the employer’s obligations. Children and adolescents typically indicated 
the employer would be their main source of information, with parents, the 
internet and the government as secondary sources. By contrast, parents indicated 
they would seek information from the government or the internet. Most could 
not correctly identify the appropriate department and/or level of government 
from which to get this information. 
Children and adolescents typically indicated a two step-approach to 
resolving disputes. First, they would approach the employer. If that was 
unsuccessful, half indicated they would quit. Fifteen percent indicated they 
would raise the issue with their parents while the remainder would take no 
further action. Parents also exhibited this two-step approach, beginning with the 
employer. If this was unsuccessful, two thirds indicated they would pursue the 
matter with the government. Forcing their child to quit was also a common 
response. One parent indicated she would take no action as this was the child’s 
problem. In the one case where a parent both indicated she would pursue a 
violation with the government and separately indicated she thought a violation 
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had occurred, the parent decided not to pursue the matter as it was not 
worthwhile for her to do so. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The study demonstrates that employers violate Alberta’s child labour laws. 
The survey data indicates there is widespread violation of occupational 
prohibitions and minimum age limits. While the interview results are highly 
suggestive that employers violate maximum hours of work limits and minimum 
wage requirements as well as make illegal deductions. There is also some 
indication that self-regulation of restaurant employment is not effective. The core 
policy question this raises is whether complaint-driven enforcement is an 
effective way to regulate child labour. 
To grapple with this, we need first to consider why employers ignore 
Alberta’s child labour laws. Part of the reason, consistent with Weil and Pyles 
(2005) discussion of complaint-driven enforcement, may be that ignorance of the 
rules and workplace practices create fundamental impediments to filing 
complaints. Consequently, employers face little chance of being caught violating 
the law and, thus, pay it little mind. The interview results provide some tentative 
support for this assertion. Children, adolescents and parents (the most likely 
complainants) were largely unaware of basic statutory employment rights. 
Further, although 95% of the subjects reported one or more violations of basic 
employment rights, none identified these as violations. This suggests that relying 
on children, adolescents and parents to trigger law enforcement activity 
designed to protect children and adolescents in the workplace may be 
inappropriate due to knowledge gaps.  
The study also suggests minors rely heavily on their employers for 
information about their rights. The degree to which employers can and do 
accurately convey information is unknown, but it is plausible that employers 
may (intentionally or unintentionally) mislead workers, particularly as such 
behaviour is often in the employer’s financial interest. During one interview, for 
example, the adolescent’s employer coincidentally walked by during discussion 
of call-in pay. Overhearing a question, the employer spontaneously and hotly 
made incorrect assertions about the adolescent’s rights in this regard. Whether 
the employer was intentionally misleading the worker or not is less important 
than the fact that the employer did mislead the worker in a way that was in the 
employer’s financial interests and did so in a way that clearly intimidated the 
worker.  
Should a child or adolescent become aware of a violation, most appear 
inclined to return to the employer (i.e., the violator) seeking remedy. If 
unsuccessful, only 15 percent of children and adolescents indicated they would 
pursue the issue (i.e., raising it with their parents). If an issue was brought to 
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parents’ attention, only a slim majority indicated they would pursue the matter 
as far as to make a complaint to the government. Herein, we see (at least 
implicitly) the cost-benefit analysis posited by Weil and Pyles (2005) limiting the 
effectiveness of complaint-driven enforcement. These results raise serious 
questions about the appropriateness of relying upon complaints to protect child 
workers. 
Tompa, Trevithick and McLeod (2007), speaking about occupational health 
and safety requirements, note actually enforcing the law appears to alter 
employer behaviour while the mere potential for enforcement does not. If 
Alberta’s complaint-driven compliance strategy does not generate many 
complaints (Barnetson, 2009a), the resulting low-enforcement environment may 
lead to widespread violation of child labour laws, particularly if there is a 
financial incentive for employers to do so. In effect, there is little risk of being 
caught. The effect of this dynamic may be compounded by the low likelihood 
employers who are caught will face any penalty for the violation.  
It is unclear why Alberta relies on worker complaints (versus random 
inspections) and cajoling employers (versus fines and prosecutions) as its 
primary enforcement strategy for protecting child labourers. Practically 
speaking, this may reflect resource limitations. Yet the degree of funding 
available for enforcement is, in truth, a political decision by a government about 
what degree of state intervention it desires in the workplace. Alberta is not alone 
in adopting modest enforcement practices. Speaking about Ontario, Tucker 
(1988, 1990) and Thomas (2009) note that employment standards have a long 
history of poor enforcement and loopholes which, they conclude, are designed to 
regulate class conflict while minimally impeding employer profitability or 
discretion. Employers have been granted additional latitude through implicit 
deregulation (i.e., ineffective enforcement and dispute resolution practices) 
based, at least partly, on the premise that state intervention in the private 
employment relationships is inappropriate. While no comprehensive analysis of 
the political economy of Alberta employment standards is presently available, 
Thomas’ (2009) analysis appears broadly applicable in Alberta. 
It is, of course, valid to note that child workers and their parents have some 
responsibility to look out for their own interests. Yet the choice of instrument(s) 
(hortatory, capacity-building, incentive-based, authority based) by which to 
achieve public policy objectives (e.g., protecting children from negative 
consequences of employment) ought to be grounded in a realistic assessment of 
whether it will work. This study raises significant questions about whether 
expecting children to enforce their rights and parents to make good decisions in 
this area is realistic. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In 2008/09, 6.3% of Alberta children (age 9-11) and 19.4% of adolescents (age 
12-14) were employed. Survey data found 78% of employed children and 21% of 
employed adolescents worked in prohibited occupations. Interview data raised 
further concerns about potentially wide-spread violations of hours of work, 
minimum wage, call-in pay, minimum age, prohibited occupations or tasks, legal 
deductions and restaurant industry regulations. This degree of non-compliance 
suggests that complaint-driven enforcement may not be an effective way to 
regulate child labour. The inability of potential complainants to recognize 
violations and their unwillingness to trigger enforcement appear to be key issues. 
The effect of improbable enforcement may be exacerbated by the financial 
incentive employers have to not comply as well as the lack of meaningful 
consequence for violations.  
It may be possible to increase compliance with child labour laws by 
supplementing complaint-driven enforcement with significant numbers of 
random inspections. This would usefully include ensuring employers are 
actually complying with the self-regulation requirements in the restaurant and 
food services industry (Barnetson, 2009a). Over time, such random inspections 
would provide a fuller picture of industries with high levels of non-compliance, 
thereby allowing more accurate targeting of enforcement resources. Further, 
where complaints reveal non-compliance, the province could also look to remedy 
all instances of non-compliance in the workplace, rather than restricting itself to 
remediating the solely for the complainant and leaving other instances of 
violations unaddressed. The government could also increase the visibility of 
child labour infractions, both through increased prosecution and by publically 
naming employers who violate child labour laws. Public naming will create 
pressure on employers to pay attention to the law, much like making restaurant 
inspections public focuses the attention of restaurateurs on sanitation.  
This study also suggests several lines for further investigation. First, at what 
rate are those whom employ children and adolescents violating employment 
standards? Second, how is the blanket policy exclusion of yard work and 
babysitting from the ambit of employment standards related to the place of 
childcare and manual labour in contemporary society? Third, are parents’ 
opinions about the benefits minors accrue from employment valid? Fourth, to 
what degree is Thomas’ (2009) analysis of the political economy of Ontario’s 
employment standards regime applicable to Alberta? 
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*  I would like to thank the Alberta Federation of Labour and Athabasca University’s 
23   Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society—Volume 16—Spring 2010   
 
 
Research Incentive Grant program for funding this research as well as Jason Foster of 
Athabasca University and two anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts 
of this article. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
AHRE. (2002). Domo fined for not paying employees. Press release. May 10. 
AHRE. (2003). Domo charged for not paying employees again. Press release. 
November 4. 
AHRE. (2004). Domo Gasoline Corporation Ltd. fined $23,000 for not paying 
employees. Press release. December 15. 
Barnetson, B. (2009a). The regulation of child and adolescent labour in Alberta. 
Just labour. 13. 29-47. 
Barnetson, B. (2009b). Narratives justifying unregulated child agricultural 
employment in Alberta. Journal of rural and community development. 4(1). 67-83. 
Bernstein, S., Lippel, K., Tucker, E. and Vosko, L. (2006). Precarious employment 
and the law’s flaws: Identifying regulatory failure and securing effective 
protection for workers. In L. Vosko (ed.). Precarious employment: 
Understanding labour market insecurity in Canada. Kingston: McGill-Queens 
University Press. 203-219. 
Breslin, C., Koehoorn, M. and Cole, D. (2008). Employment patterns and work 
injury experience among Canadian 12 to 14 year olds. Canadian journal of 
public health. 99(3): 201-204.  
England, G. (2008). Employment law in Canada, 2nd Ed. Irwin: Aurora. 
Government of Alberta. (2010). Charges under the Occupational Health and 
Safety Act and the Employment Standards Code Downloaded 2010.01.19. 
http://employment.alberta.ca/SFW/6751.html  
Hawkesworth, M. (1988). Theoretical issues in policy analysis. New York: State 
University of New York Press. 
HRSDC. (2006). Minimum age for employment in Canada. Downloaded 
2007.08.16 http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/en/lp/spila/clli/eslc/minage(e).pdf 
Irvin, J., McBride, S. and Strubin, T. (2005). Child and youth employment standards: 
the experience of young workers under British Columbia’s new policy regime. 
Vancouver: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. 
Luke, H. & Moore, G. (2004). Who’s looking out for our kids. Deregulating child 
labour law in British Columbia. Vancouver: Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternatives. 
McLean, A. (2010, March 18). Alberta temporary foreign workers getting ripped 
off: NDP. Edmonton journal. www.canada.com. Downloaded 2010.03.18. 
O’Donnell, S. (2009, July 22). Capital Ex midway vendor faces $300,000 fine. 
Edmonton Journal. www.canada.com . Downloaded 2009.07.22. 
Barnetson   24 
 
 
Schultz, L. and Taylor, A. (2006). Children at work in Alberta. Canadian public 
policy. 32(4): 431-441. 
Teeple, G. (2006). The riddle of human rights. Garamond: Aurora. 
Thomas, M. (2009). Regulating flexibility: The political economy of employment 
standards. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Tompa, E., Trevithick, S. and McLeod, C. (2007). Systematic review of the 
prevention incentives of insurance and regulatory mechanisms for 
occupational health and safety. Scandinavian journal of work, environment and 
health. 33(2): 85-95. 
Tucker, E. (1983/84). The determination of occupational health and safety 
standards in Ontario, 1860-1982. McGill Law Journal. 29: 260-311. 
Tucker, E. (1988). Making the workplace ‘safe’ in capitalism. Labour/Le Travail. 21: 
45-85. 
Tucker, E. (1990). Administering danger in the workplace: The law and politics of 
occupational health and safety regulation in Ontario, 1850-1914. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press. 
Weil, D. and Pyles, A. (2005). Why complain? Complaints, compliance and the 
problem of enforcement in the US workplace. Comparative labor law & policy 
journal. 27(1). 59-92. 
